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The Second Demographic
Transition in the United




THE NOTION THAT the demographic transition in the West has two distinct
phases was originally suggested by Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa (1986) and
elaborated by van de Kaa (1987). These authors proposed the terminology
of a first and second demographic transition. The 1986 article posited that
new living arrangements, and cohabitation (premarital or postmarital) in
particular, were not solely the outcomes of changing socioeconomic condi-
tions or rising female employment, but equally the expression of secular
and anti-authoritarian sentiments of better-educated men and women who
held an egalitarian world view, placed greater emphasis on Maslow’s (1954)
“higher order needs” (i.e., self-actualization, individualistic and expressive
orientations, need for recognition), and, to use Inglehart’s term (1970, 1990),
had stronger “postmaterialist” political orientations. Furthermore, the sec-
ond demographic transition would also be characterized by substantial post-
ponement of both marriage and parenthood, and by an increase in the share
of births to unmarried couples. If fertility control during the first transition
was a matter of avoiding births of higher parities and births at older ages in
order to safeguard the opportunities of the children already born, during
the second it is a matter of postponing or eschewing parenthood altogether
because of more pressing competing goals such as prolonging education,
achieving more stable income positions, increased consumerism associated
with self-expressive orientations, finding a suitable companion and realiz-
ing a more fulfilled partnership, keeping an open future, and the like (see
also Ariès 1980). At the aggregate level postponement of fertility would not
only lead to a temporary dip of fertility below replacement level, but to
structural, long-term subreplacement cohort fertility. This in turn would
create a growing need for “replacement migration.” Thus the second demo-
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graphic transition will be directly linked to the further development of West-
ern societies in a multiethnic and multicultural direction (van de Kaa 2002;
Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2006).
Twenty years after its introduction, the relevance of the term “second
demographic transition” may still be contested, but the manifestation of what
it predicted is not: by now, every characteristic of the second demographic
transition has spread to the majority of industrialized Western populations,
including Mediterranean and Central European countries.1 And, judging
from the latest data on extraordinary degrees of postponement of marriage
and fertility in the Far East (e.g., Jones 2006; Retherford and Ogawa 2005),
and from very recent information on cohabitation in Japan (Raymo and
Iwasawa 2006), non-Western industrialized or industrializing populations
could also be following suit. If this proves to be the case, the second demo-
graphic transition will be more than what David Coleman (2003) called a
“parochial northwestern European idiosyncracy.”
But is the United States an exception to all of this? The US total fertil-
ity rate rose from 1.81 births per woman in 1981 to just above replacement
level in 2001. The American total fertility rate now towers high above those
of many of its industrial competitors, and especially above those of the EU-
25 and Japan. Add to this that the United States is still taking in more im-
migrants, and the conclusion is clear: the US population will continue to
grow, its aging will be less pronounced, and the country will easily avoid
the negative population growth momentum that many other industrialized
countries are about to face as a result of 25 years of “lowest-low” fertility—
that is, TFRs below 1.5 children.
The social historian and conservative commentator Allan C. Carlson
(2005) wrote the following about “American demographic exceptionalism”:
Europe is dying; so may be Japan, also done in by a broad rejection of children.
However, unlike the late 1960s and 1970s, when America was leading the glo-
bal retreat from marriage and children, something different is now happening
here: Americans are breaking free from the Malthusian darkness. (p. 8)
Carlson offered explanations:
This was not, as some suggest, a function of a rising number of births out of
wedlock. Between 1995 and 2000, even marital fertility rose by 11 percent,
the first sustained increase in that number since the mid-1950s. Nor was this
a function of America’s greater ethnic diversity. The increase in fertility among
Americans of European descent actually climbed by 19 percent after 1981, to
a total fertility rate of 2.065.
The best explanation for America’s greater fecundity is the higher degree of
religious identification and behavior shown by Americans, when compared
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to Europeans. In the year 2000, 45 percent of Americans reported attending
religious services during the prior week; in Europe, under ten percent. (ibid.)
The notion of American demographic “exceptionalism” and its inter-
national significance is echoed in influential publications (e.g., Eberstadt
2004; Torrey and Eberstadt 2005). Also, The Economist (2002) projected that
by 2050 the US population will be half a billion and the EU-15 population
will have declined to just over half its current size of 382 million. And Phillip
Longman echoes these views in Foreign Affairs (2004) and in an editorial in
USA Today (13 March 2006). As the editorial’s title, “The liberal baby bust,”
indicates, the core issue is again differential fertility between the religious
and the secular. But in this piece, Longman clearly recognizes the duality
in this respect within the United States, and links it directly to what is often
referred to as the contemporary American version of the late-nineteenth-
century German Kulturkampf, or “American Culture War” (cf. Hunter 1991).
Longman writes:
Tomorrow’s children, therefore, unlike members of the postwar baby boom
generation, will be for the most part descendants of a comparatively narrow
and culturally conservative segment of society. To be sure, some members of
the rising generation may reject their parents’ values, as often happens. But
when they look for fellow secularists with whom to make common cause, they
will find that most of their would-be travelers were quite literally never born.
Many will celebrate these developments. Others will view them as the death
of the Enlightenment. Either way, they will find themselves living through
another great cycle of history.
Is the US population immune to the transition features as a result of
higher spiritual values and social conservatism? Or is its course a sub-nar-
rative of the presumed “Culture War” between the “red” (Republican) and
the “blue” (Democratic) parts of America, with the “red” outbreeding the
“blue”? Or is it a more complex story in which ethnic differentials in fertil-
ity make an appreciable difference, and in which older, typical American
features such as high teenage and poverty-related single motherhood still
play a major role?
We first summarize the most important US trends in fertility and house-
hold formation patterns. But the lion’s share of the analysis is devoted to
the description of American spatial patterns of fertility and household for-
mation among non-Hispanic whites and to the detection of their correlates.
We perform this analysis first at the level of the 50 states and subsequently
for the 3,141 counties.2 From this analysis it will be abundantly clear that
the United States is a heterogeneous country, with even more variation
within its borders than within the EU-25, and that many of its features come
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closer to being textbook examples of the second demographic transition than
to “demographic exceptionalism.” Finally, in what follows we refer often to
ethnic distinctions in the United States since large parts of the Hispanic popu-
lation are still in the process of completing their first demographic transi-
tion and therefore statistically distort the  picture for most of the other seg-
ments of the population.
Major components of the second demographic
transition in the United States
Marriage and fertility postponement, premarital cohabitation, and even fer-
tility within cohabitation in the United States follow trends similar to those
in western Europe, but spatial variation also remains very important in the
United States.
Age at first marriage for both non-Hispanic white and black popula-
tions has been rising since the 1970s, in tandem with a rise in both single
living and especially cohabitation. As can be seen in Table 1, the majority
(62 percent) of the cohort of white women born in 1950–54, and reaching
age 25 in the late 1970s, were married by age 25 without premarital cohabi-
tation. In that cohort, a further 12 percent were already married by that
age, but had started a cohabiting union before their marriage. Another 6
percent of white women were still in cohabitation by age 25, and only 20
percent had not yet started a union. The contrast with the cohort born in
the years 1965–69, and reaching age 25 in the early 1990s, is striking. For
the latter the proportion directly moving into marriage was almost halved,
TABLE 1   Patterns of union formation among US white and black
women: Status at age 25 for four birth cohorts
Cohabiting Married Married
and not after without
No union married cohabitation cohabitation
White women, cohort of
1950–54 20 6 12 62
1955–59 22 11 18 49
1960–64 25 14 21 40
1965–69 29 14 25 32
Black women, cohort of
1950–54 31 12 13 44
1955–59 47 16 10 27
1960–64 44 22 12 22
1965–69 46 23 14 18
SOURCE: US National Survey of Family Growth 1995 as reported by Raley 2000: Figure 2.5.
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from 62 percent to 32 percent, and the shares of those married after cohabi-
tation and of those still in cohabitation by age 25 both doubled. Also, the
proportion still single rose from 20 percent to 29 percent. Note the shift among
the black population as well: by age 25, the fraction directly married with-
out prior cohabitation declined from 44 percent to 18 percent in the same
period, whereas the proportion still cohabiting by age 25 nearly doubled.
Age at first marriage was rising, largely because of the spread of cohabita-
tion. In other words, the United States in this respect exhibits a trend simi-
lar to Europe’s since the 1970s.
However, as is also the case in the EU (from Sweden to Greece), the
overall American pattern hides large spatial differentials. The degree of het-
erogeneity can be seen in Figure 1, where the 50 states are plotted accord-
ing to an indicator of marriage postponement and an indicator of the inci-
dence of cohabitation.3 Marriage postponement is measured by the
proportion of women aged 25–29 never married as recorded in the US Cen-
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FIGURE 1  Location of 50 US states according to the postponement of 
marriage (y-axis) and the incidence of cohabitation (x-axis), 2000
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by unrelated adults of the same or a different sex. The positive relationship
between the two indicators is apparent (r = .51), but the main purpose of
the figure is to highlight the position of the various states in this two-di-
mensional space of marriage being postponed or declining in favor of co-
habitation. The plot and circles reveal several clusters with distinct patterns.
1) Early marriage and little cohabitation. A large part of the South fits
this picture, with states ranging from West Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky,
and the Carolinas to Alabama, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Texas.
But also Utah and Idaho in the West have less than a quarter of non-His-
panic white women never married in the age group considered, in combi-
nation with less than 5 percent of households headed by cohabiters.
2) Very late first marriage and moderate levels of cohabitation. In this group
are several Northeastern states—New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
New Jersey, Connecticut—as well as California.
3) High levels of cohabitation with moderate proportions of never-married women
25–29. This group contains the rest of New England, but also Nevada and
Alaska. Evidently, the states in group 3 have a higher proportion of younger
adults in a union (either marriage or cohabitation) than states in group 2.
A similar picture emerges in Figure 2 with respect to same-sex house-
holds. The incidence of cohabitation is expressed as a percentage of all house-
holds, whereas that of same-sex cohabitation is pro mille. Same-sex cohabi-
tation is still an exceptional feature and taking it as the cause of low fertility,
as some conservative commentators suggest (e.g., Gallagher 2006), is not
supported.
Figure 2 shows a correlation (r = .60) between the incidence of same-
sex and overall cohabitation. As in the previous figure, quite a bit of varia-
tion remains. The striking feature of the plot is two clusters of states that
are more differentiated by the incidence of same-sex households than by
the incidence of overall cohabitation. Also, among the states that have higher
percentages cohabiting (above 5 percent), some have considerably higher
shares (above 7 per thousand) of same-sex households than others. The
most “tolerant” states with respect to both cohabitation and same-sex co-
habitation are Vermont and California, followed by Massachusetts, Wash-
ington, New York, Delaware, Florida, and Maine. These states are closely
followed by a few others such as Colorado, Oregon, New Mexico, and Ha-
waii. At the other extreme are states with low incidences of both same-sex
and overall cohabitation, but there is no systematic Southern cluster. In-
stead, the low cohabitation states on both accounts are often Midwestern
and include the Dakotas, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Montana, and Idaho, along
with Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Arkansas.
In Europe and Canada the steady expansion of the proportions cohabit-
ing was soon followed by the emergence of a new feature: parenthood within
cohabitation without converting the union into a marriage. In countries with
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low teenage nonmarital fertility, the trend of fertility within cohabitation can
be documented by the increase in out-of-wedlock childbearing, but in the
United States the matter does not permit such a straightforward interpreta-
tion. The main reason is that the birth rate among the unmarried has a num-
ber of contributing components that cannot easily be separated via the cur-
rent background information. We would ideally like to know whether the
birth occurred to a single mother or a cohabiting one, but there is no infor-
mation in the vital registration on the presence of a partner in the house-
hold. Hence, to discover a trend in cohabitation fertility, we have to use indi-
rect indications such as the age and ethnic affiliation of the mother.
Nonmarital fertility rose uninterruptedly from a low level of about
90,000 in 1940 to 1.47 million in 2003 (Medical News Today, 31 October
2005). As a share of all births, nonmarital births accounted for 3.8  per-
cent in 1940 and 35.7 percent in 2003. The birth rate per thousand un-
married women aged 15–44 rose from 7 in 1940 to 46 in 2004 (NCHS
2005). But because the number of unmarried women has itself been grow-
FIGURE 2  Location of 50 US states according to the incidence of same-sex 
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ing rapidly, the nonmarital birth rate has stabilized since the early 1990s.
In absolute numbers, nonmarital birth rates per five-year age group have
declined steadily since 1991 among teenagers, but less so among older
women, including those in their 30s (Ventura and Bachrach 2000: 24, NCHS
2005: Figure 1). In fact, women in the age groups 20–24 and 25–29 are
the main contributors to the overall rise in numbers of nonmarital births
after 1994. Moreover, the decline in the share of teenagers occurs among
both blacks and whites, but the rise after age 20 is predominantly a white
contribution (Ventura and Bachrach 2000: 19–20). These statistics fuel the
speculation that there has been a gradual shift in relative contributions
from teenagers remaining single to women in their 20s reproducing within
cohabitation. This is corroborated by survey data (National Survey of Fami-
lies and Households 1988; National Survey of Family Growth 1995—see
Raley 2001: Table 4), which show that the share of all births contributed
by cohabiting women aged 15–29 rose from about 5 percent in 1970–74
to 12 percent in 1990–94, and that of single women 15–29 rose from 13
percent to 23 percent. As a result, the share of births among married women
declined from 82 percent to 65 percent over the same two decades. Also
an increasing proportion of singles decided to cohabit before the child’s
birth, and a decreasing proportion of cohabitors converted their union into
marriage before that birth (Seltzer 2000; Raley 2001). These survey fig-
ures document the trend prior to 1995, and no such clear decomposition
is available for subsequent years. All available indications point toward
both a greater incidence and a greater acceptability of procreation within
cohabitation in the United States.
An additional, and major component of the second demographic tran-
sition is the postponement of parenthood and the development of a late
fertility schedule. The degree of postponement can be documented by the
proportions of women never married in the age group 25–29 or 30–34 and
by the proportions who are still childless by these ages. In Figure 3 those
percentages found in the 2000 census by state are shown for non-Hispanic
white women aged 25–29.
There is, of course, a strong positive correlation between these post-
ponement indicators (r = .92), but the scatterplot mainly shows the spatial
pattern of the unfolding of the second demographic transition. The van-
guard in the United States with respect to postponement is once again made
up of Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island,
and California. In these six states, about half of the non-Hispanic white
women in this age group are not yet married, and more than 60 percent
have not yet become parents. At the other extreme are states where less
than a quarter of non-Hispanic white women are still single and less than
40 percent still childless. This group comprises West Virginia, Kentucky,
Oklahoma, Mississippi, Arkansas, Utah, and Wyoming.
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The postponement of fertility is also associated with fertility well be-
low replacement, as shown in Figure 4, which plots the non-Hispanic white
total fertility rate for 2002 against an index of fertility postponement for
these women at the same date (data in Sutton and Mathews 2004). The
index is the ratio of the sum of age-specific fertility rates above age 30 to
the sum of these rates between ages 20 and 29.
The figure reveals that for the US non-Hispanic white population, only
four states have above-replacement fertility (i.e., higher than 2.05 children):
Utah, Idaho, Alaska, and Kansas. Three others come very close: Oklahoma,
South Dakota, and Nebraska. All of these states have early fertility schedules
for non-Hispanic white women. But in many other states, an early fertility
schedule (not counting teenage fertility) is no guarantee against subreplace-
ment fertility. For instance, Arkansas, Kentucky, West Virginia, Mississippi,
and Wyoming have the youngest fertility schedules in the United States, but
all have subreplacement fertility among non-Hispanic white women.
At the other end of the distribution the leading states with respect to
postponement typically dip below a total fertility rate of 1.8 (California, New
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SOURCES: US Census Bureau 2003a and 2003b.
FIGURE 3  Location of 50 US states according to percent never married 
(x-axis) and percent childless (y-axis) among non-Hispanic white women 
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These states have fertility patterns that are highly similar to those of west-
ern European countries. In fact, in the European Union the Netherlands
has long held the record in fertility postponement, with a peak in child-
bearing in the age group 30–34. As shown in Figure 5 non-Hispanic whites
in Connecticut and New Jersey are just as late, and whites in Massachusetts
bear children even later than the Dutch. For comparison the schedules for
France and non-Hispanic whites in the United States as a whole are also
included in the figure, together with the earliest age schedule of all US states,
that of Arkansas.
If we take a typical western European or Scandinavian postponement
index of about 0.80 as a benchmark and compare the US non-Hispanic white
population with European populations, then we should add a number of
other states to the American trio of Massachusetts (postponement index =
150 as against 126 for the Netherlands or 107 for Sweden), Connecticut
(131) and New Jersey (130). These extra states would be: New York (112),






























































aRatio of sum of age-specific fertility rates above age 30 to the sum of these rates between ages 
20 and 29.
SOURCE: Sutton and Mathews 2004. 
FIGURE 4  Location of 50 US states according to the total fertility rate 
(TFR) (y-axis) and the index of fertility postponement (x-axis) among 
non-Hispanic white women, 2002
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(84), New Hampshire (84), and Delaware (81). In these instances fertility
after age 30 would be 80 percent or more of that between ages 20 and 29.
At the other end of the distribution the lowest postponement indexes in
the non-Hispanic white populations of the United States are for Arkansas
(40), Mississippi (41), West Virginia (41), Kentucky (45), Wyoming (45),
Oklahoma (45), Tennessee (50), Alaska (51), Idaho (51), and Alabama (51).
From this analysis it is evident that the demographic map of the United
States with respect to patterns of family formation exhibits strong contrasts.
A sizable portion of the US non-Hispanic white population displays all the
typical characteristics of the second demographic transition, whereas another
major segment shows few signs of this new demographic pattern.
Spatial patterns of family formation: Factors and
correlates at the state level
In this section we undertake a more detailed analysis of the spatial patterns
of family formation in the United States and their socioeconomic, cultural,
and political correlates. We enlarge the set of demographic indicators to






































SOURCES: Council of Europe 2005, CD-ROM; Sutton and Mathews 2004.
FIGURE 5  Age-specific fertility rates (5-year age groups) in the Netherlands 
and France and among non-Hispanic whites in selected US states and the 
United States as a whole, 2002
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
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dence of abortion, divorce rates, and household composition measured at
the level of the 50 states. We have chosen to use two indicators to capture a
particular phenomenon in order to minimize idiosyncratic indicator effects.
For instance, the incidence of abortion is measured once per thousand live
births and once per thousand women aged 15–44. Similarly, fertility post-
ponement is indicated by the postponement ratio (previously described)
based on vital statistics and by the census-based percentages of women still
childless at ages 25–29. In the current analysis, 19 demographic indicators
are used, and they track two distinct dimensions in the patterning of Ameri-
can family formation. These two dimensions emerged clearly from a classic
Principal Component Analysis (PCA), followed by a Varimax orthogonal
factor rotation. Together the two factors explain 67.3 percent of the total
TABLE 2   Correlations between 19 demographic variables and their
two underlying dimensions (factors): 50 US states




Percent non-Hispanic white women 25–29
without children in household, 2000  .933 –.186
Percent non-Hispanic white women 25–29
never married, 2000  .905 –.370
Percent non-Hispanic white ever-married women
 25–29 without own children in household, 2000  .902 –.097
Abortions per 1,000 live births, 1992  .887  .057
Percent non-Hispanic white women 30–34
never married, 2000  .882 –.326
Abortion rate per 1,000 women 15–44, 1996  .836  .136
Non-Hispanic white fertility postponement ratio
(fert. 30+/ fert. 20–29), 2002  .794 –.411
Same-sex households per 1,000 households, 2000  .754  .191
Non-Hispanic white total fertility rate, 2002 –.725  .009
Non-Hispanic white fertility rate 15–19, 2002 –.675  .633
Percent households that are “families,” 1990 –.642  .328
Percent households with cohabiters of same or
different sex, 2000  .517 –.148
Divorce rate per 1,000 population, 1990 –.457  .548
Total fertility rate, all races, 2002  .338 –.155
Percent nonmarital births, 1990  .329  .803
Percent births to teenagers, 1986 –.303  .875
Divorce rate per 1,000 population, 1962 –.277  .462
Percent population 30+ living with and responsible
for grandchildren, 2000 –.189  .886
Percent nonmarital births, 2000  .182  .851
NOTE: Correlations > .50 in bold.
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variance contained in the 19 indicators. The definitions of the variables and
their respective correlations with the two underlying dimensions (i.e., fac-
tor loadings) are presented in Table 2. The variables are ordered according
to their strength of correlation with factor 1.
The first principal component—the “second demographic transition” (or
SDT)—is identified by the postponement indicators of both marriage and par-
enthood among non-Hispanic whites, the higher incidence of abortion, the
nonconventional household types based on cohabitation, and low overall fer-
tility levels. In other words, the first principal component clearly identifies
the emergence of the second demographic transition in the 50 states.
As distinct from the western European pattern, however, divorce rates
in the United States are not positively correlated with the SDT factor. The
very early rises in American divorce rates from the late 1940s onward cre-
ated a spatial pattern unrelated to that of the current second demographic
transition. Catholic states maintained low divorce rates in the United States,
while Protestant states had rising rates. The lesson here is that the early
divorce maps do not predict the later SDT maps in the United States, whereas
they do so in several EU countries (Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002).
The other principal component in Table 2 (uncorrelated with the first
one)—for which we use the shorthand “vulnerable women and children”—
is identified by high teenage fertility, including that of non-Hispanic whites,
high fertility out of wedlock, and the emergence of households in which
grandparents have become the caretakers of children. This is evidently an
older feature of early family formation in the United States, with unmar-
ried teenagers or young women—black, white, or Hispanic—becoming
mothers, ending up as single-parent households, or needing their own par-
ents to look after their children.
The location of US states with respect to these two principal compo-
nents of American family formation is shown in Figure 6. The four quad-
rants identify four contrasting types of family formation. At the bottom left
are states that are resisting the SDT characteristics but that are also conser-
vative in that they have few teenage mothers, low nonmarital fertility, and
hence few grandparents needing to look after grandchildren. The states in
this cluster are the Dakotas, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Wyoming, Idaho, and
Utah. The other cluster that is resistant to the second demographic transi-
tion so far, but has high proportions of teenage mothers, single mothers,
and reliance on grandparents, is located in the lower right corner of the
figure. It contains Southern states, such as South Carolina, Alabama, Mis-
sissippi, Louisiana, Tennessee, Oklahoma, and Arkansas.
The states in vanguard of the second demographic transition are found
in the upper half of Figure 6, but they too are differentiated according to
what happens with their children. High on measures of the second demo-
graphic transition, but with low teenage motherhood are several North-
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eastern states: Massachusetts, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New
Jersey. Also advanced on second demographic transition measures but ex-
periencing more early teenage fertility and single and needy parents are
California and Nevada, but also Delaware and Florida. Aside from the four
“corner” states in Figure 6 lies middle-of-the-road America with average
scores on both factors. Examples are Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, and Oregon,
all located near the center of the figure.
These two basic factors in US family formation can be related to a se-
ries of variables: economic (income, poverty), socioeconomic (education,
:
–2.0 3.02.01.00–1.0


























NOTE: For explanation of components see Table 2 and discussion in the text.
FIGURE 6  Location of states according to two principal components of 
US family formation (scales in standard deviations)
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urbanization), political (voting), and cultural (ethnicity, religion). The re-
sults are presented in Table 3. Set A lists the various correlates of the “sec-
ond demographic transition” dimension, and set B the best correlates of the
“vulnerable women and children” component. These outcomes permit a fur-
ther interpretation of the regional demographic picture of the United States.
Table 3 shows that the second demographic transition factor is strongly
correlated with being a wealthier state, with disposable household incomes
above the US average, and with being highly urbanized and high percent-
ages of the population living in metropolitan areas. Moreover, the SDT map
also correlates positively with high proportions of Catholic populations (many
not practicing) and higher proportions of adults having college degrees (BA
and higher). Finally, states with high proportions of unionized workers tend
to score higher on the SDT factor.
 The second demographic transition is clearly negatively correlated with
high proportions being Evangelical Christians and with voting for conser-
TABLE 3   Selected political, socioeconomic, and cultural correlates of
the two dimensions of US family formation, 50 US states
A. Best correlates of the “second demographic
transition” dimension
Percent vote for Bush, 2000 –.88
Percent vote for Bush, 2004 –.87
Disposable personal income, 2001 +.70
Percent metropolitan, 2000 +.68
Percent metropolitan, 1970 +.65
Percent Catholic, 1990 +.62
Percent Evangelical,a 2000 –.62
Percent population 25+ with BA, 1990 +.62
Percent workers unionized, 2001 +.50
Disposable personal income, 1980 +.49
Percent vote Nixon 1972 (vs. McGovern) –.46
Percent vote Goldwater 1964 (vs. Johnson) –.43
B. Best correlates of the “vulnerable women
and children” dimension
Percent population 25+ HS graduates, 1990 –.69
Percent population in poverty 1998–2000 +.66
Percent population black, 2000 +.66
Percent population non-Hispanic white, 2000 –.61
Percent Evangelical/Mormon +.57
Percent vote Goldwater 1964 (vs. Johnson) +.54
Percent vote Nixon 1972 (vs. McGovern) +.54
Percent population 25+ with BA, 1990 –.45
Disposable personal income, 2001 –.43
aIncludes Mormons in Utah
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vative Republican candidates in past presidential elections, that is, in favor
of Barry Goldwater (as opposed to Lyndon Johnson) in 1964 and in favor
of Richard Nixon (against George McGovern) in 1972. But the most strik-
ing feature in Table 3 is the very strong negative correlation between the
SDT pattern and the percentage vote for George W. Bush (–.88 and –.87) in
2000 and 2004. The “blue states,” which vote predominantly for Demo-
cratic candidates in local and national elections, are advanced on SDT mea-
sures, while the “red states,” which vote predominantly for Republicans,
lag. We return to this point later.
The correlates of the teenage and unmarried mothers indicators in Table
3 are well known: lower average disposable incomes, lower proportions fin-
ishing high school, higher proportions in poverty, higher proportions black
or Hispanic, and high proportions of Evangelical Christians or Mormons.
Many states within America’s “Bible belt,” which do not or only weakly
exhibit the manifestations of the second demographic transition, tend to
have more widespread poverty and low education, more common teenage
childbearing, young single-mother families, and high divorce rates.
The SDT–electoral voting connection
On occasion demographers have been successful in helping to predict elec-
tion results, although their preoccupation runs in the opposite direction:
linking demographic outcomes to cultural and political indicators. Examples
from Europe are the strong links between voting for secular parties and the
speed of the fertility decline during the first demographic transition (e.g.,
Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986), and the prediction of the regional outcomes
in the Italian divorce referendum of the 1970s on the basis of the timing of
the historical fertility transition 40 years earlier (Livi Bacci 1977). But the
very strong negative correlation found in the United States between the
SDT factor and the percentage of votes for George W. Bush in 2000 and
2004 is to our knowledge one of the highest spatial correlations between
demographic and voting behavior on record.
While some may have expected these correlations to be stronger in
2004 than in 2000 because the electorate seems to have been far more di-
vided and polarized on issues in 2004, an examination of selected results
from the exit polls during both elections shows that most of the “cultural
divide” was well established in 2000.
Table 4 shows the percentage of Americans voting for Bush in 2000
and 2004 according to their exit poll answers. The percentages according to
demographic, moral, and cultural characteristics are remarkably similar in
the two elections. For instance, 74 and 77 percent of those who felt abor-
tion is always illegal voted for Bush in 2000 and 2004. The religious right
voted overwhelmingly for Bush in both elections.
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Of course some issues, such as terrorism, the war in Iraq, and same-sex
marriage, were irrelevant in 2000. Voters’ views on these issues were strongly
associated with their vote in 2004. Some comparable items available in 2000
and not in 2004 were questions about the importance of the Clinton scandals
TABLE 4   Percentage of Americans voting for George W. Bush in 2000
and 2004 according to responses to election day exit polls
2000  2004
Demographic characteristics
Women  43  48
White  54  58
African American  9  11
Hispanic  44
Married  53  57
Married, with children  56  59
Gay 25  25
Union member 34  38
Political identity
Democrat  11  11
Liberal  13  13
Conservative  81  84
Religion/religiosity
Protestant  56  59
White Protestant  63  68
White religious righta  80  78
Church, more than weekly  63  64
Church, weekly  57  58
Church, monthly  46  50
Church, a few times a year  42  45
Church, never  32  36
Values
Abortion always legal  25  25
Abortion mostly legal  38  38
Abortion mostly illegal  69  73
Abortion always illegal  74  77
Clinton scandals were very important  80 —
Lieberman’s religion makes him a worse vice president  72
Moral values are most important issue  —  80
Terrorism is most important issue —  86
Same-sex couples should be allowed to legally marry —  22
Things are going well in Iraq —  90
aChoice was white religious right in 2000 and born-again white in 2004.
SOURCE: «http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html» and «http://
www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/results/index.epolls.html».
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and Joseph Lieberman’s religion. President Clinton’s liaison with Monica
Lewinsky was viewed very unfavorably by Bush voters; likewise, Lieberman’s
Jewish faith was a negative factor (or perhaps a question mark).
We reproduce the scatterplot between the second demographic transi-
tion values and the vote for Bush across the 50 states. Because the correla-
tion between a state’s vote for Bush in 2000 and 2004 is .97, Figure 7 shows
results only for 2004.
Strong correlations also hold with respect to the various components
of the SDT factor. For instance, the percentage voting for Bush correlates
strongly with the percentage of non-Hispanic white women never married
at ages 25–29 (postponement of first marriages) (r = –.84), with the per-
centage of non-Hispanic white women aged 25–29 without children (fertil-
ity postponement) (r = –.78), and with the non-Hispanic white total fertil-
ity rate in 2002 (r = +.78). This last relationship is shown in Figure 8.
These findings beg the question whether the zero-order correlations
are spurious. More specifically, it would be inappropriate to give the corre-
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FIGURE 7  Relationship between the SDT factor and the vote for Bush 
in 2004, US 50 states (r = –.87)
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lations a direct causal interpretation, since they could be the result of a com-
mon set of other variables that causally influence both demographic behav-
ior and voting pattern. In other words, two variables that are themselves
causal results of the same determinants must of necessity be correlated.
To check this hypothesis, we performed a number of partial correla-
tion tests. The zero-order correlation between voting and the SDT factor
will be spurious if the partial correlations are zero or are drastically reduced.
The outcomes of the test are reported in Table 5 for the correlation between
voting for Bush and the non-Hispanic white total fertility rate and the sec-
ond demographic transition factor as identified in Table 2.
The first partial correlation test assumes that the common causal factors
producing a high zero-order correlation between the demographic and the
voting variables are structural in nature, for example, related to a state’s av-

































































FIGURE 8  Relationship between the non-Hispanic white total fertility rate 
in 2002 and the percentage vote for Bush in 2004, US 50 states (r = +.78)
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ization. When the three best correlates of these independent dimensions are
controlled for, the partial correlation is barely reduced and still lies well above
.70. Thus, the regional patterns related to income, education, and urbaniza-
tion fail to account for the Bush–SDT and the Bush–TFR correlation.
The result is the same if we add two more variables related to the ethnic
composition of a state. The percentage black and the percentage Hispanic in
the total population in tandem with the three structural variables fail to re-
duce the partial correlation. The third panel shows the results of adding two
variables related to religion to the structural ones. These are the percentage
Evangelical or Mormon and the percentage Catholic. The reduction in the
coefficient is somewhat larger, but the partial correlations are still in the neigh-
borhood of .70, far from zero. In fact, if we omit the three structural variables
and only make use of the two religion variables, the results are even more
marked in reducing the Bush–white TFR partial correlation to around .65.
For the Bush–SDT correlation, the largest reduction is achieved by retaining
the three structural predictors and the religious variables (–.73 or –.74).
The conclusion we draw is that the zero-order correlation between
SDT variables and voting for Bush cannot be considered spurious or as the
outcome of the operation of the common causal determinants used here.
TABLE 5   Partial correlations: Are the zero-order correlations
between the non-Hispanic white total fertility rate or the SDT factor
and the vote for Bush in the 50 US states resistant to controls?
Non-Hispanic white SDT factor
TFR 2002 and and vote for
vote for Bush in Bush in
2000 2004 2000 2004
No controls .771 .782 –.880 –.871
After controls for
Three structural variables
Disposable personal income, 2001
Percent population 25+ with BA, 1990
Percent population metropolitan, 2000  .755 .761  –.787 –.812
Three structural variables + ethnicity
Percent black, 2000
Percent Hispanic, 2000 .755 .761  –.840 –.853
Three structural variables + religion
Percent Evangelical/Mormon
Percent Catholic .686 .686  –.734 –.742
Religion alone
Percent Evangelical/Mormon
Percent Catholic .654 .667  –.788 –.755
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The control variables fail to reduce the zero-order correlation coefficients to
an extent significant enough to warrant such a conclusion. And since the
demographic picture was unfolding well before the 2000 and 2004 elec-
tions, we accept the hypothesis that the spatial pattern of the second demo-
graphic transition in the United States was a nonredundant co-determinant
of the voting outcomes at the state level. But because states themselves are
heterogeneous, we now examine the outcomes using counties as the unit
of analysis before we formulate final conclusions.
Do the findings hold at the county level?
Correlation coefficients might turn out to be considerably weaker if we ex-
amine relationships among all 3,141 counties in the United States. Political
scientists may only be interested in the relationship at the state level be-
cause only the state vote is important for presidential elections. However,
our earlier findings will be far more robust if the relationships hold across
counties and regions as well. To this end, we constructed a much larger
data file, with multiple indicators for degree of urbanization, wealth and
poverty, female education, ethnic composition, and religious affiliation. In
addition, we constructed the demographic indicators for non-Hispanic whites
wherever possible. Some measures are based on older data (1988), which
allows us to capture the geographic pattern at earlier stages of the second
demographic transition.4
As in the analysis of the 50 states, similar factors emerge as underlying
demographic indicators for the 3,141 counties. As shown in Table 6 the
SDT factor strongly correlates with the indicators of marriage and parent-
hood postponement and with the indicators of households formed on the
basis of unmarried cohabitation. Negative correlates of the SDT factor are
teenage fertility and the total fertility rate, which of course incorporates
teenage fertility. On the other hand, an uncorrelated second factor loads
strongly on teenage fertility, divorce, female-headed households, and chil-
dren growing up with grandparents and in households other than that
headed by a married couple. The second factor is again indicative of the
degree of vulnerability of young women and children.
The SDT factor can be decomposed into (i) a “postponement” compo-
nent, indicative of late marriage and, especially, late fertility and (ii) a “co-
habitation” component. If the two separate components are constructed for
the 3,141 counties, they correlate at the 0.69 level. In several European coun-
tries these two components of the second demographic transition—postpone-
ment and cohabitation—do not correlate as strongly, either over time or spa-
tially.5 The stronger spatial correlation between these components in the
United States makes the country more of a textbook example of the second
demographic transition than an exception.
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The data for the 3,141 counties are also used to produce a set of col-
ored maps of the various demographic dimensions discussed so far. As these
cannot be reproduced here, we refer the reader to a website (www.sdt.psc.isr.
umich.edu) containing these maps and annotations. Note that the counties
maps exist in a classic version and in a demographically more meaningful
version with counties drawn proportional to population size.
As in the state-level analysis, we examine the relationship between
the second demographic transition factor and the vote for Bush in 2004.
Table 7 shows the results of tests of the relationship between the spatial
SDT pattern and election results. As expected, the negative correlation be-
tween the SDT factor and the Bush vote weakens as one moves from the 50
TABLE 6   Demographic indicators and their two underlying factors:
3,141 US countiesa




Percent never-married women, 25–29 (WNH)  .837 –.018
Percent age at first birth= 28+ in 1988 (WNH)  .812 –.293
Mean age at first birth in 1988 (WNH)  .792 –.410
Percent childless women, 25–29 (WNH)  .787  –.091
Percent never-married women, 30–34 (WNH)  .780  .074
Fertility postponement ratio, 1988
(fert. 30+/fert. 20–29) (WNH)  .733 –.329
Percent cohabiting households (WNH)  .652  .284
Percent cohabiting households (total)  .606  .461
Percent teenage births, 1988 (WNH) –.556  .613
Percent same-sex cohabiting households (total)  .517  .364
Total fertility rate, 1999 (WNH) –.503 –.143
Percent same-sex cohabiting households (WNH)  .495  .263
Percent population 30+ living with and responsible for
grandchildren (WNH) –.449  .646
Percent population 30+ living with grandchildren (WNH) –.318  .699
Percent children living in married-couple family (WNH) –.273 –.609
Percent children living in married-couple family (total) –.245 –.746
Percent population 30+ living with and responsible for
grandchildren (total) –.227  .641
Percent unmarried births, 1988 (WNH)  .164  .479
Percent currently divorced women, 35–44 (WNH)  .127  .530
Percent population 30+ living with grandchildren (total) –.101  .657
Percent female-headed families/households (total)  .069  .706
Percent female-headed families/households (WNH)  .031  .649
NOTE: WNH= white non-Hispanic.
aDate is 2000 unless otherwise specified. Correlations > .50 in bold.
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states to the 3,141 counties, from –.88 to –.57. There are various reasons
for this reduction in the strength of association. The classic explanation is
that many counties have very small populations so that there is increased
volatility in the measurements, particularly the demographic measurements.6
When we rerun the analysis for the 1,559 counties with at least 25,000
inhabitants, the zero-order correlation between the SDT factor and the vote
for Bush is restored to –.67. This is again indicative of a strong correspon-
dence between a detailed voting map and an SDT map.
What happens if controls are introduced for variables that are com-
monly considered causal antecedents of both voting patterns and demo-
graphic household formation patterns? If the original correlation is reduced
to a level close to zero after such controls, there will no longer be a basis for
considering any spatial causal relationship (in either direction) between the
second demographic transition and voting. If the partial correlation is re-
duced but still substantially larger than zero, then the control variables are
partially but not entirely responsible for the original correlation. In that in-
stance, there is room for a direct causal interpretation between SDT and
voting outcomes, but the effect is smaller than would be implied by a full
causal interpretation of the zero-order correlation.
As in the analysis by states in Table 5, the best predictor of voting in
each set of structural determinants was entered as a control variable in Table
7. For the degree of urbanization this was the logarithm of population den-
sity; for wealth the percentage of families with incomes of  $75,000+; and
TABLE 7   Zero-order correlation between the SDT factor and the
percent voting for Bush in 2004, and partial correlations after controls
for structural and cultural variables (all US counties and counties
with at least 25,000 inhabitants)
All Counties
counties 25,000+
Zero-order correlation, SDT–vote for Bush –.568 –.667
Partial correlations after controls for:
3 structural variables
Log population density,
percent families with incomes of $75,000+, and
percent women 25+ with professional degrees –.453 –.552
Same 3 structural + 2 ethnicity variables
Percent black, percent Hispanic –.541 –.618
Same 3 structural + 2 religion variables
Percent Evangelical (+Mormon), percent Catholic –.346 –.398
2 religion variables alone –.468 –.532
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for education the percentage of women aged 25+ with professional degrees.
The other structural indicators are strongly correlated with one of these three,
and any additional use of multicollinear information is largely redundant
and will not improve the results. In addition to the three best structural
controls, two variables are introduced to capture ethnic heterogeneity at
the county level: the percentage black and the percentage Hispanic in 2000.
To capture the religious factor, two variables are added: the percentage
Catholic and the percentage Evangelical or Mormon among church adher-
ents (Jones et al. 2002).
The results in Table 7 indicate that the control for five variables (captur-
ing urbanization, wealth, female education, Evangelical/Mormon, and Catholic
adherence) is the most powerful in reducing the zero-order correlation be-
tween the second demographic transition and the Bush vote. The combina-
tion with ethnic composition added to the three structural indicators yields a
less marked reduction. But in either column of Table 7, the smallest partial
correlation is still far from zero, and the most potent combination of control
variables cannot reduce the original correlation by half. These results still mean
that we cannot discard the possibility of a direct causal effect of the county
demographic pattern on the 2004 presidential election outcome. The objec-
tion to this causal inference as it now stands is that there could be some set of
control variables not included in this analysis for which the partial correla-
tion will be close to zero. But any such new control variable (or variables)
must be correlated strongly with both the voting and the demographic pat-
terns and weakly correlated with the controls already used in Tables 5 and 7.
The hunting season is open.
Aside from the effect of volatility of several measures for counties
with small populations, there is another reason for the reduction of the
SDT–voting correlation when 3,141 counties are considered instead of 50
states. The reason emerges in Table 8, where the analysis has been run
separately for the counties within the four census regions and nine cen-
sus divisions in the United States. The national correlations, both zero or-
der and partial, are pulled down by weak relations for the South, and par-
ticularly for the two South Central divisions. By contrast, the zero-order
and partial correlations remain very high for the counties in New England,
the Mid-Atlantic states, and the Mountain and Pacific states. Hence, South-
ern voting patterns may still be conditioned by powerful determinants other
than those connected to the unfolding of the second demographic transi-
tion, such as the persistence of older ethnically- or social-class-based po-
litical affiliations and antagonisms. Recall that the spatial distribution of
the SDT factor shows that most of the South is in the very early stages of
the second demographic transition. Likewise, spatial distributions of the
black and Hispanic populations show them to be concentrated in these
census divisions as well.
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Conclusions
Allan Carlson’s argument, cited at the outset, for US demographic exceptional-
ism starts from the observation that the overall US total fertility rate is much
higher than that of the European Union and Japan, or for that matter the
TFR of the rest of the industrialized world. This is clearly true. But he ar-
gues that this is not due to the contribution of ethnic minorities, whether
black or Hispanic, but to white fertility itself. Carlson locates the explana-
tion in “the higher degree of religious identification and behavior” in the
United States than in any other industrialized country.
Is there such an “American exceptionalism”? That the American total
fertility rate is close to 2.0 is the result of the following circumstances. Al-
though non-Hispanic white fertility dropped below replacement, it stayed
in the vicinity of 1.8, and that was high enough for the contribution of the
black and especially of the Hispanic population, which together form about
a quarter of the US population, to raise the TFR of the United States as a
whole to replacement level. The TFR of the Hispanic population has re-
TABLE 8   Zero-order and partial correlations between the SDT factor and
the vote for Bush according to different aggregations, US counties within
census regions and divisions
Zero- 3 struc- 3 struc-
Number order 3 struc- tural + tural + 2
of corre- tural 2 ethnic religious 2 ethnic 2 religious
counties lation variables variables variables variables variables
United States 3,141 –.568 –.453 –.541 –.346 –.600 –.468
Region
Northeast 217 –.803 –.729 –.725 –.635 –.739 –.684
Midwest 1,055 –.605 –.518 –.506 –.454 –.557 –.570
South 1,424 –.415 –.365 –.380 –.243 –.364 –.288
West 445 –.773 –.639 –.646 –.513 –.760 –.681
Division
New England 67 –.700 –.482 –.461 –.414 –.629 –.665
Mid-Atlantic 150 –.790 –.552 –.494 –.442 –.601 –.680
East North Central 437 –.606 –.616 –.608 –.525 –.537 –.523
West North Central 618 –.572 –.462 –.442 –.395 –.542 –.549
South Atlantic 590 –.510 –.406 –.500 –.339 –.569 –.455
East South Central 364 –.252 –.287 –.347 –.247 –.168 –.185
West South Central 470 –.284 –.286 –.234 –.162 –.167 –.147
Mountain 280 –.750 –.592 –.598 –.469 –.740 –.661
Pacific 165 –.733 –.636 –.625 –.582 –.700 –.742
NOTES: For definitions of variables see Table 7. The aggregations are US census regions and US census divisions, «http://
www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf».
SOURCE: Census of Population and Housing, summary files and microdata files; Natality detail file, 1988; and Religious
Congregations and Membership in the United States: 2000.
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mained consistently high at around 2.7 to 2.9 since 1990. The contribution
of black fertility is of less importance since it has been close to replacement
level during the last decade. The total fertility rate of Asians, Pacific Island-
ers, and American Indians has been almost identical with that of non-His-
panic whites (Sutton and Mathews 2004: 31). Hence, the ethnic factor is
important in maintaining the overall American TFR around replacement
level. In effect, a large segment of the Hispanic population is still complet-
ing its first demographic transition. The conclusion here is that the United
States is a textbook example of the second demographic transition where
immigration and higher immigrant fertility compensate for subreplacement
fertility of much of the native population.
Is there “American exceptionalism” among the non-Hispanic white
population? If one is judging solely on the basis of the TFR, the answer is
no since only four states with small populations have fertility levels above
replacement. But if we take a more balanced view based on multiple indi-
cators, the answer is both yes and no.
Yes, there is an “American exceptionalism” among a non-negligible
section of the population. That section is mainly located in the Midwest,
the Great Plains, and the South. It is on average much more rural than
metropolitan, less well educated, adheres more to Evangelical Christianity
or Mormonism, and tends to have higher levels of divorce. With respect to
teenage fertility and young single mothers, there is a divide between the
Northwestern and Southeastern states, with the latter still having high to
very high levels of unmarried fertility among young mothers (both whites
and blacks). Although the rates are falling, several American states still have
teenage fertility levels that are the highest in the industrialized world.
No, there is little or no “American exceptionalism” in the remainder
of the United States, mainly along the northern Atlantic, the Pacific, the
Great Lakes, and the less religious West (Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado).
This is the part of America where such features of the second demographic
transition as lower and later fertility and tolerance for cohabitation have
been emerging in much the same way as in western Europe and Canada
(see Juby and Le Bourdais 2005 for recent Canadian figures, and Bernier
and Roy 2006 for a detailed analysis of Canadian patterns). This is the
America with higher education and higher incomes, greater concentration
in metropolitan areas, and high abortion figures but also lower teenage fer-
tility and lower divorce.
Hence the picture would be better described by the term “American
bipolarity” than “American exceptionalism.” Furthermore, the strong cor-
relation between this demographic duality and the country’s current po-
litical divide is more typical of textbook transitions than of an exceptional
case. As indicated before, the French, Swiss, Belgian, German, Portuguese,
and Italian historical first demographic transitions all exhibited clear con-
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nections with the political maps (e.g., Livi Bacci 1977; Lesthaeghe and
Wilson 1986), and this has continued to be the case for the regional pat-
terns of the second demographic transition as well (Lesthaeghe and Neels
2002). Seen from this international perspective, the patterning of the sec-
ond demographic transition in the United States is not exceptional at all.
Moreover, the two SDT sub-dimensions of “postponement” and “cohabi-
tation” are more strongly correlated in the United States both in time and
space than in the EU-25, and from that perspective the American SDT is
also a textbook example.
The resistance of the spatial correlation between the 2000 and 2004
presidential election results and the SDT factor to controls warrants further
attention. It appears that this relationship cannot be totally explained by
the effects of such common structural causal antecedents as urbanization,
personal and household wealth, or education. Also the addition of a reli-
gious trichotomy (Catholic, Evangelical/Mormon, other) or an ethnic one
(black, Hispanic, other) is largely inadequate to account for the correlation
between voting results and the SDT factor. As already noted, this is not
proof of direct causality from SDT to election outcomes, since theoretically
there is always a possibility of finding better-performing control variables.
But unless such better controls are identified and tested, the hypothesis that
the US spatial SDT pattern influenced the last two presidential elections can-
not be refuted. The only qualification to this statement that we can make
so far is that this is not a strong pattern in the South Central counties, where
voting outcomes may still be determined by older ethnic or social contrasts.
These results also shed additional light on the “culture war” debate.
The reference to the nineteenth-century Kulturkampf in Germany is prob-
ably an appropriate one, but the translation of Kampf (strife, struggle) as
“war” is definitely an exaggeration. But then, J. D. Hunter (1991), the au-
thor of Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America, does not argue that the
US population is polarizing. He documents that political and community
elites have produced antagonistic discourses since the 1980s. But on the
other hand, the denial of the existence of any cultural polarization among
the public at large seems an exaggeration as well. Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope
(2005) refute the “myth of a polarized America” on the grounds that shift-
ing positions of political parties and their candidates can produce effects that
are identical with those of shifting public positions. Hence, their diagnosis is
indeed “centrist voters and polarizing elites” (pp. 167–180).
Our findings are not in agreement with Fiorina et al.’s thesis of an
unchanging public. Recall that both the SDT factor as measured here and
its strong link to voting patterns are based on actual behavior of the entire
American population. What we find suggests that not just the rhetoric of
media, politicians, and community leaders on abortion, same-sex marriage,
and other issues, but also the regional population variations in demographic
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behavior have been contributing to the polarization witnessed in the last
two presidential elections. The middle group or “centrist voters” can still be
the modal one, but the more extreme ends of the spectrum have moved
farther apart. We have shown that such a change in population distribu-
tions is not solely the product of media or elite discourse but also the likely
product of shifting demographic behavior, known as the second demographic
transition. What makes the United States particularly interesting in the over-
all Western context is that the conservative and religious right is openly
and vocally trying to fight back (e.g., with amendments seeking to ban same-
sex marriage, closure of abortion clinics). This has not happened in Europe,
Canada, or Australia. But despite a number of American idiosyncracies, the
bottom line is that the current US family and household patterns  follow all
major “second demographic transition” trends, and that the spatial contrasts
in this respect have proved to be quite capable of co-determining important
political outcomes.
Notes
1 The only areas where cohabitation and
out-of-wedlock fertility have remained very
modest in Europe are Poland, Ukraine, Greece,
and Cyprus.
2 By 2004, the United States had 3,142
counties. However, the newest county (Broom-
field county, Colorado) was formed after the
2000 census. Since all indicators except for the
2004 presidential election results are based on
2000 or earlier years, Broomfield county is ex-
cluded from the analysis.
3 We treat Washington, DC as a county.
4 Owing to confidentiality concerns,
1988 was the last year that NCHS produced
detailed natality files that had county-level in-
formation for all counties. In subsequent
years, only counties of 100,000 or more can
be identified.
5 Especially in the Mediterranean coun-
tries, postponement of marriage and parent-
hood preceded the emergence of cohabitation
by at least two decades.
6 The measurements for most counties
with a population of less than 5,000 have been
combined with contiguous counties (based on
Census Bureau definitions of Public Use
Microdata areas) to produce a weighted mea-
surement that is assigned to all small counties
in the same PUMA. While this provides more
stability in the measurement, it introduces a dif-
ferent sort of error. Not all PUMAs are homo-
geneous. Thus, in some cases we have com-
bined apples and oranges. When the analysis
is restricted to counties with a population of
25,000 or more, we not only eliminate small
sample sizes, we also eliminate the error based
on combining several small units.
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